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In the prosecution of the war, however, Ojukwu fell out so badly with Zik who deplored Ojukwu’s demagoguery, costly obduracy and dictatorial tendencies during the war. At a critical OAU confab on the war with the world press present, where Zik wanted Ojukwu to play the victim-under-dog card, Ojukwu it turned out, could not resist a Churchillian rhetoric probably aimed at the world press, effusing to African leaders that “no black power can defeat Biafra.”
Empty words, to be sure, but where such propaganda played well to the sagging morale of the Biafran soldiers and the populace back home, it jarred so badly at the diplomatic architecture that Zik was striving to cobble together among African heads of states. Zik was both mortified and infuriated and apparently never forgave Ojukwu for this blunder which, he believed, probably stretched the war with attendant loss of lives.
Former Chief of Defence Staff, Lt. General Domkat Bali, in an interview with Saturday Punch put his finger right at the heart of the ambivalent relationship between Zik, Ojukwu and the Igbos when noted, “I have often told anybody I met that as far as I am concerned, the greatest black man from Africa was the late Chief Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Igbo man. But most Igbo say Ojukwu is the greatest, and so, the Igbo gave Ojukwu all the honour, not Zik. I asked them why they honour Ojukwu more than Zik, they said Zik served the Nigerian nation but Ojukwu served the Igbo nation.”
Where to the Igbos, Ojukwu was an all-time hero, to the non-Igbos, he was the arch-rebel, a dangerous man who must be watched all the time. In 1983, for instance, despite joining the ruling NPN, enhancing the party’s penetration of the eastern region, yet Ojukwu could not make it to the senate. Not only was he sabotaged by his party, Zik’s NPP simply put a nail to his ambition. The great Ikemba was humbled at the polls by a rookie, Dr. Edwin Onwudiwe of the NPP. After beating Ojukwu, though, that was the last anybody heard of Dr. Onwudiwe in Igbo politics!
Is it simply ignorance of the depth of the Igbo angst during this period or perhaps a case of expedient elite amnesia that make some non-Igbo fail to understand why the Igbos drape Ojukwu in the halo of a redeemer? In retrospect, it appears that the matter went deeper than that. It seemed that from the beginning, Ojukwu was a marked man.
Perhaps, it was a sort of Freudian slip, perhaps he was merely being facetious, but another statement from General Domkat Bali shed a lot of light into the underlying mindset that shape national establishment’s perception of Ojukwu.
In his interview with Saturday Punch, Bali who is famous for his frankness and taciturnity at the same time observed: “I was in the artillery, he joined the army in the infantry. Yes, Ojukwu was a graduate of Oxford University, a very reputable university in the world. So, the question we were asking was that, why did Ojukwu join the army? Was it out of passion for the job or for some ulterior motive? Such question arose then because as a graduate of Oxford then, getting juicy employment was not a problem; in fact, you could be employed anywhere, you had many good jobs to choose from. But we wondered why he chose the army. The army then was a dumping ground for school dropouts and those who were not so intelligent, not for an Oxford graduate that Ojukwu was. So, that was my suspicion of him: Why did he join the army at the time he did, was it out of pure interest to be a soldier or was it because he thought the army would play a vital role in the ranking of the Nigerian state? That was my suspicion. I was suspicious of him from the beginning.”
Here then is the great irony. If as at the early days of our independence, those Bali described as “school dropouts” and “not so intelligent” were being mobilized by their foresighted leaders to go into the army, believing rightly or by the persuasion of the colonial leaders, that the army was going to play vital role in Nigeria’s political future, why did Bali and his co-establishment agents of the north consider Ojukwu not suitable for the same profession merely because he was too intelligent, an Oxford graduate who probably had access to the same strategic information? In other words, why should any student of power like Ojukwu, one that studied at Oxford, drinking from the erudition and rhetoric of post-World War 2 of Winston Churchill, not understand and be entitled to the same ambition that animates his lesser educated northern counterparts? Why should an Ojukwu, for that matter, not be entitled to participate in the strategic power gambit using the military route just like the northern militocrats?
Bali’s thesis may well provide deeper insight into why the Nigerian Civil War ultimately became inevitable. First, it was an ego battle between two leading rivals. The rivalry theory was reinforced last week by what Brigadier-General Oluwole Rotimi told Punch columnist, Tunde Fagbenle, writing punultimate Sunday. Rotimi used to serve as Ojukwu’s deputy in the Nigerian army. Prior to political crisis, the rivalry between the two colonels, Ojukwu and Gowon, was such that even their staffers were not on speaking terms at the office. It was a different thing outside the office.
The root of this rivalry turned out, once again, to be arising from Ojukwu’s education. This was how Rotimi captured the matter: “I think it began with the fact that although Gowon was commissioned in 1956 and Odumegwu-Ojukwu was commissioned in 1958, because of the antedent seniority, Odumegwu-Ojukwu became at par with Gowon…You see, those of us who were graduates were given antedate of seniority of two to three years, compensating for the time we spent in the university. And so Odumegwu-Ojukwu’s antedate of seniority placed him at par with Gowon and there the rivalry began.”
When Gowon emerged head of state under these cloudy circumstances, Ojukwu rightly objected, insisting that military seniority should be followed, in which case, Brigadier Ogundipe, not Gowon, should have been the head of state. See how monumental matters of state at times get wrapped in the fragile egos of the individuals!
To the Igbos, Biafra ultimately became inevitable because not only was Gowon’s leadership in breach of the military tradition, he further reneged on the Aburi Accord which accepted Ojukwu’s proposal for a loose federalism or confederation based on the regions. Evidently, Gowon came to the meeting ill-equipped to deal with the better educated Ojukwu, so the outcome of the negotiation favoured the wiser.
When Gowon returned with the Aburi documents, some western diplomats and powerful bureaucrats purportedly opened his eyes to landmines in the deal he had just signed. With oil in the eastern region and the inevitability of fiscal federalism (read: resource control!) the deal was considered potentially suicidal to the less endowed regions. End of Aburi accord for Gowon! For the Igbos at that point, Aburi was the only option—the only hope in Nigeria. Enter the Republic of Biafra. Enter the famous “police action” that ultimately snowballed into a 30-month civil war.
Gowon’s experience at the Aburi Accord more than anything else probably informed his decision to return to school after his ouster from power. He ultimately ended up with a doctorate degree in political science. Wise decision, except that opportunity to square up with Ojukwu in any negotiating table was gone for ever.
It is perhaps, the greatest vindication of Ojukwu’s foresight that the confederation or at least effective federalism which Ojukwu sought in 1967 is the basis for today’s agitation for sovereign national conference by radical elite today. If for nothing else, at least, even on this score alone, Ojukwu had his last laugh on Nigeria.
In future, we shall return to the Ojukwu story, but next week, we shall be looking at other intervening national crisis.
Empty words, to be sure, but where such propaganda played well to the sagging morale of the Biafran soldiers and the populace back home, it jarred so badly at the diplomatic architecture that Zik was striving to cobble together among African heads of states. Zik was both mortified and infuriated and apparently never forgave Ojukwu for this blunder which, he believed, probably stretched the war with attendant loss of lives.
Former Chief of Defence Staff, Lt. General Domkat Bali, in an interview with Saturday Punch put his finger right at the heart of the ambivalent relationship between Zik, Ojukwu and the Igbos when noted, “I have often told anybody I met that as far as I am concerned, the greatest black man from Africa was the late Chief Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Igbo man. But most Igbo say Ojukwu is the greatest, and so, the Igbo gave Ojukwu all the honour, not Zik. I asked them why they honour Ojukwu more than Zik, they said Zik served the Nigerian nation but Ojukwu served the Igbo nation.”
Where to the Igbos, Ojukwu was an all-time hero, to the non-Igbos, he was the arch-rebel, a dangerous man who must be watched all the time. In 1983, for instance, despite joining the ruling NPN, enhancing the party’s penetration of the eastern region, yet Ojukwu could not make it to the senate. Not only was he sabotaged by his party, Zik’s NPP simply put a nail to his ambition. The great Ikemba was humbled at the polls by a rookie, Dr. Edwin Onwudiwe of the NPP. After beating Ojukwu, though, that was the last anybody heard of Dr. Onwudiwe in Igbo politics!
Is it simply ignorance of the depth of the Igbo angst during this period or perhaps a case of expedient elite amnesia that make some non-Igbo fail to understand why the Igbos drape Ojukwu in the halo of a redeemer? In retrospect, it appears that the matter went deeper than that. It seemed that from the beginning, Ojukwu was a marked man.
Perhaps, it was a sort of Freudian slip, perhaps he was merely being facetious, but another statement from General Domkat Bali shed a lot of light into the underlying mindset that shape national establishment’s perception of Ojukwu.
In his interview with Saturday Punch, Bali who is famous for his frankness and taciturnity at the same time observed: “I was in the artillery, he joined the army in the infantry. Yes, Ojukwu was a graduate of Oxford University, a very reputable university in the world. So, the question we were asking was that, why did Ojukwu join the army? Was it out of passion for the job or for some ulterior motive? Such question arose then because as a graduate of Oxford then, getting juicy employment was not a problem; in fact, you could be employed anywhere, you had many good jobs to choose from. But we wondered why he chose the army. The army then was a dumping ground for school dropouts and those who were not so intelligent, not for an Oxford graduate that Ojukwu was. So, that was my suspicion of him: Why did he join the army at the time he did, was it out of pure interest to be a soldier or was it because he thought the army would play a vital role in the ranking of the Nigerian state? That was my suspicion. I was suspicious of him from the beginning.”
Here then is the great irony. If as at the early days of our independence, those Bali described as “school dropouts” and “not so intelligent” were being mobilized by their foresighted leaders to go into the army, believing rightly or by the persuasion of the colonial leaders, that the army was going to play vital role in Nigeria’s political future, why did Bali and his co-establishment agents of the north consider Ojukwu not suitable for the same profession merely because he was too intelligent, an Oxford graduate who probably had access to the same strategic information? In other words, why should any student of power like Ojukwu, one that studied at Oxford, drinking from the erudition and rhetoric of post-World War 2 of Winston Churchill, not understand and be entitled to the same ambition that animates his lesser educated northern counterparts? Why should an Ojukwu, for that matter, not be entitled to participate in the strategic power gambit using the military route just like the northern militocrats?
Bali’s thesis may well provide deeper insight into why the Nigerian Civil War ultimately became inevitable. First, it was an ego battle between two leading rivals. The rivalry theory was reinforced last week by what Brigadier-General Oluwole Rotimi told Punch columnist, Tunde Fagbenle, writing punultimate Sunday. Rotimi used to serve as Ojukwu’s deputy in the Nigerian army. Prior to political crisis, the rivalry between the two colonels, Ojukwu and Gowon, was such that even their staffers were not on speaking terms at the office. It was a different thing outside the office.
The root of this rivalry turned out, once again, to be arising from Ojukwu’s education. This was how Rotimi captured the matter: “I think it began with the fact that although Gowon was commissioned in 1956 and Odumegwu-Ojukwu was commissioned in 1958, because of the antedent seniority, Odumegwu-Ojukwu became at par with Gowon…You see, those of us who were graduates were given antedate of seniority of two to three years, compensating for the time we spent in the university. And so Odumegwu-Ojukwu’s antedate of seniority placed him at par with Gowon and there the rivalry began.”
When Gowon emerged head of state under these cloudy circumstances, Ojukwu rightly objected, insisting that military seniority should be followed, in which case, Brigadier Ogundipe, not Gowon, should have been the head of state. See how monumental matters of state at times get wrapped in the fragile egos of the individuals!
To the Igbos, Biafra ultimately became inevitable because not only was Gowon’s leadership in breach of the military tradition, he further reneged on the Aburi Accord which accepted Ojukwu’s proposal for a loose federalism or confederation based on the regions. Evidently, Gowon came to the meeting ill-equipped to deal with the better educated Ojukwu, so the outcome of the negotiation favoured the wiser.
When Gowon returned with the Aburi documents, some western diplomats and powerful bureaucrats purportedly opened his eyes to landmines in the deal he had just signed. With oil in the eastern region and the inevitability of fiscal federalism (read: resource control!) the deal was considered potentially suicidal to the less endowed regions. End of Aburi accord for Gowon! For the Igbos at that point, Aburi was the only option—the only hope in Nigeria. Enter the Republic of Biafra. Enter the famous “police action” that ultimately snowballed into a 30-month civil war.
Gowon’s experience at the Aburi Accord more than anything else probably informed his decision to return to school after his ouster from power. He ultimately ended up with a doctorate degree in political science. Wise decision, except that opportunity to square up with Ojukwu in any negotiating table was gone for ever.
It is perhaps, the greatest vindication of Ojukwu’s foresight that the confederation or at least effective federalism which Ojukwu sought in 1967 is the basis for today’s agitation for sovereign national conference by radical elite today. If for nothing else, at least, even on this score alone, Ojukwu had his last laugh on Nigeria.
In future, we shall return to the Ojukwu story, but next week, we shall be looking at other intervening national crisis.
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